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The Moral Status of the Human Embryo 
According to Peter Singer: Individuality, 
Humanity, and Personhood 
by 
Fr. Joseph Howard 
The author is Executive Director of the American Bioethics Advisory 
Committee. He is a graduate student in Moral Theology and Biomedical 
Ethics at the Catholic University of America. 
Peter Singer is a prominent Australian philosopher currently at 
Princeton University who many might consider to hold radical views on 
human life. Singer argues that the early human embryo is not a human 
individual who is a person. He contends that the potential of a human 
embryo existing in the laboratory is not the same as the one who is already 
implanted in the endometrium of the uterus. Redefining the term 
"potentiality", Singer examines the potency of the egg and sperm alone as 
well as jointly. 
Central to understanding the philosophy of Peter Singer on human 
life is his rejection of the doctrines of specieism and sanctity of human life. 
Singer's thesis is that not all members of Homo sapiens are persons and not 
all persons are members of the species Homo sapiens. What constitutes a 
"person" for Singer remains open to be subjectively defined according to 
the characteristics that are chosen. This remains crucial for Singer in terms 
of which organisms can be subjected to clinical experimentation as regards 
moral rights . Peter Singer's arguments against the early human embryo 
being an individual human person are unconvincing. While admitting that 
he wants to free us from particular religious views, he fails to make an 
adequate argument that not all members of Homo sapiens are persons and 
not all persons are members of Homo sapiens. Peter Singer's use oflogic is 
consistently followed to the very end of his startling conclusions. 
Peter Singer argues that we should reject the view that a human 
zygote or early human embryo is a distinct human individual. 1 In his view, 
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the "identity thesis" poses serious problems. He takes up the issue of 
monozygotic twinning where one human embryo splits into two human 
embryos with the same genetic code. Concerning this procedure he then 
asks the following questions: Which one of the two human embryos is the 
original one? Is either of the two human embryos the original one? Is it 
even possible to know? How are we to understand an early human embryo 
as a distinct human individual in light of the possible formation of a 
chimera? If during sexual intercourse, two different human embryos are 
formed with separate genetic codes and the two of them combine to form 
only one, how can it be that there was originally one distinct human 
individual? As Singer asks, who is the baby : Mary or Jane, Mary and 
Jane, or Nancy?2 According to Singer, the issue of totipotency in the early 
human embryo must also be considered. Since it is well-recognized that 
the early human embryo consists of totipotent cells, how can one distinct 
human individual be present? He next considers the status of the 8-cell 
human embryo. Since it consists of eight totipotent cells, are there not 
eight distinct individual entities present with each one oriented toward 
further development? Are there not eight "potential" babies? 
Peter Singer then addresses the issue of whether or not a human 
embryo is a "potential" human being. He states that there are two potential 
arguments that are relevant when attempting to determine whether the 
human embryo at fertilization is a human being or merely a "potential" human 
being. Singer will argue that there is no coherent notion of "potential" which 
allows the argument of potentiality to be applied to embryos in the laboratory? 
What is the moral or ontological status of human embryos generated 
in the laboratory by in vitro fertilization (JVF)? In the case of an 8-cell human 
embryo generated by IVF, Singer observes that this embryo is less likely to 
implant when transferred to the uterus if growth in culture'continues much 
beyond the eight-cell stage. Singer also observes that while there have been 
reports of keeping a human embryo alive in culture for nine days, such an 
embryo has a zero probability of becoming a person. Singer's argument is 
very clear: while IVF can generate human embryos, they cannot develop 
into persons unless they are transferred to the uterus; even then, in the best 
of circumstances, they will most likely not develop into a person.4 
Potential and the Oxford English Dictionary 
To understand Peter Singer one must closely examine his views on 
"potentiality" as related to the beginning of human life. He asks whether there 
is any difference between the "potential" of the human embryo and the 
"potential" of the egg and sperm when still separate as well as considered 
jointly? Singer directly addresses this by referring to the Oxford English 
Dictionary to define the term "potential" as meaning that it is "possible" for the 
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human embryo to become a human person, as possibility is a necessary 
condition for potentiality. Using that source, Singer argues that it is possible 
for the embryo to become a person as possibility is a necessary condition for 
potentiality. Using this logic, Singer recognizes that it is not "logically" 
impossible for a human blastocyst (an embryo existing five to ten days 
following fertilization) in a laboratory to develop into a person; he then 
proceeds to argue that it is not "logically" impossible for a human egg to 
develop into a person either, since parthenogenesis often happens in some 
species and no logical contradiction is involved in it happening in our species. 
Singer raises the question of "potentiality" of two human blastocysts 
with one existing in utero and the other existing in vitro. Singer claims that 
they have entirely different potentials: the one existing in utero is a 
potential person while the one existing in vitro cannot possibly survive to 
become a human person. The issue could be stated in another way: if a 
living human fetus is going to die in utero, is the potential for personhood 
lost before the fetus dies in utero? For Singer the answer is definitively 
yes, just as it is for the difference between the potential of an eight-cell 
human embryo in the laboratory versus the potential of a human blastocyst 
consisting of hundreds of cells. This difference of potential, Singer says, is 
in the physical sense that is relevant to the present state of both knowledge 
and technology.5 So if it ever becomes possible with technology for human 
embryos to develop without ever being transferred to a woman, then those 
blastocysts in the laboratories will also be able to become people. 
Singer now tries to make the same argument with human eggs: if 
parthenogenesis could occur in humans, every egg would be a "potential" 
person. Singer is clear that the egg and sperm separately have no special 
moral status; however, he argues that it seems impossible to use the 
potential of the embryo as a ground for giving it special moral status. He 
also states that the egg and sperm have the potential to develop into a 
mature human being. The environment in which the human embryo 
develops is most important: it must be allowed to count as an entity and a 
"potential" must be denied to the embryo existing on its own outside such 
an environment. 6 Singer claims that parthenogenesis and fertilization are 
alike - why should the egg after parthenogenesis be regarded as a different 
individual from the egg before parthenogenesis? His claim is that both 
biological processes take the development of the egg a stage further; 
however, the potential of the egg is retained - after all, the egg had the 
"potential" to become this person all along.7 Singer recognizes that the 
"potentiality" is highly significant in terms of the morality of 
experimentation on an entity; however, his argument is that one cannot 
prohibit experimentation on or disposal of human embryos and remain 
unconcerned about how eggs and sperm are treated. In Singer's view, there 
is a great difficulty if one tries to explain why the embryo in the laboratory 
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has a potential greatly different from that of either the egg alone or the egg 
and sperm considered jointly.8 
Homo Sapiens and Other Species 
To begin to understand Singer on the issue of human personhood as it 
relates to the beginning of human life, it is necessary to know that he 
challenges openly the doctrine of the sanctity of human life, as the title of his 
book, Unsanctifying Human Life, so indicates. He admits he wants those 
involved in medicine to reconsider some foundations of the decisions that are 
being made. At the very core of this issue is whether or not there is a radical 
difference between the values of human versus animal lives - both in degree 
and quality. That human life has such unique value is the very idea that Singer 
wants to challenge. He compares and contrasts two situations: that of an 
infant with Down syndrome requiring serious medical care with that of 
exposing monkeys to addictive narcotics in order to learn the effects of such 
substances.9 What is being questioned is critical: is it right to "save" a 
Mongoloid child when the mother does not want "it", while at the same time 
slowly and painfully killing monkeys in order to learn something? 
Now comes Singer's doctrine against specieism - isn't it wrong to 
treat human and non-human animals differently because one is said to be 
superior to the other? Central to this is Singer's view that in some cases 
human infants do not have some characteristics that are found in higher 
non-human animals - the capacity to feel pain, to act intentionally, to solve 
problems, and to communicate with and relate to other human beings. For 
Singer, to treat a severely handicapped differently from a pig or monkey is 
discrimination that is rooted in specieism. Drawing upon the analogy of 
race being nearly always irrelevant to how a person is treated, the species 
of a being should also be irrelevant. Invoking utilitarianism, Singer makes 
an argument for drug experimentation on retarded "human beings" rather 
than utilizing monkeys since fewer subjects would be needed and less 
suffering would be inflicted. Singer admits that the doctrine of the sanctity 
of human life is based on discrimination of species. 
There are human beings - the hopelessly senile and irreparably brain-
damaged - who cannot be distinguished from other animals in respect of their 
potential. This can be understood in the context of Singer's explicit claim: the 
right to life is not the right of member of the species of Homo sapiens, as 
Singer demonstrates in his third "new" commandment. 1O Not all members of 
the species Homo sapiens are persons, and not all persons are members of the 
species Homo sapiens. This can be understood very easily when Singer again 
turns toward the Oxford English Dictionary to define the term "human" as 
having or showing the qualities or attributes proper to or distinctive of man. 
For Singer, classifying a being as human depends on the subjective qualities or 
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attributes that are distinctive of men and women. If it is subjectively decided 
that self-awareness or self-consciousness are counted, then severely retarded 
infants would not be included though they are members of our species. We 
could simultaneously choose to include apes, dolphins, and other mammals 
based upon their abilities as human beings. What Singer is pointing to is that 
our definitions of what a human is could and perhaps would change which 
"organisms" or "beings" are subjected to experimentation. Singer admits that 
this determination is based upon both the meaning and the interpretation of the 
term "human" in the dictionary. 
In regard to the doctrine of the sanctity of human life, Singer is asking 
how it is possible to characterize only our human species as sacred. What is it, 
Singer asks, that makes us so sacred that we are distinguished as superior to 
other animals? Singer begins to address this with his premise that animals 
and human beings can be seen as equals. We human beings often claim that all 
human beings are equal. Singer rejects this emphatically, recognizing that 
humans have different capacities, needs, sensitivities, abilities to 
communicate, and different capacities to experience both pleasure and pain. I I 
Arguing that those individuals with superior intelligence may not use other 
humans for their own ends, how is it possible for us to exploit non-human 
beings? To address this question the experience of suffering in all beings 
must be considered regardless of the nature of the being. If a being is 
incapable of suffering or experiencing happiness there is nothing to 
consider. 12 The key element for Singer in evaluating all beings is that of 
sentience. Characteristics such as intelligence are just as arbitrary as are 
the utilization of race. Specieism allows a human person to place the 
interests of his own species over that of other species. 
So how does one decide which organism or being to use for 
experimental protocols while not invoking specieism? How does one 
choose to select among infants who are orphaned or retarded versus adult 
human beings or animals? For Singer, the answer is clear: for example, a 
preference for infants and retarded human beings who have no idea of what 
is going to happen to them as opposed to adults who would know what was 
going to happen to them. 
Perhaps orphaned infants and retarded human beings could be used 
since they are in the same category.13 Singer's utilitarianism is brought 
forth in that "beings" capable of self-awareness, abstract thought, complex 
communication, etc. are more valuable than those without these capacities; 
consequently, those without these certain capacities can be used. This 
forms the basis for preferring certain other animals over human beings who 
have the characteristics of "normal" human beings. Rejecting specieism 
and admitting that he is invoking utilitarianism, Singer argues that the only 
experiments that could be justifiably performed on a human being are 
those that involve an orphaned, irreparably retarded human being. 14 This is 
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based on the fact that the parents do not want the "orphan" coupled with 
"its" severe lack of "capacities" so that now we regard "it" as "non-
human". This forms the basis for allowing Singer to interpret and define 
what a "human person" is and is not. Severely retarded infants do not 
count as human beings even though they are members of Homo sapiens; on 
the contrary, apes, dolphins, and perhaps other mammals could be counted 
as human beings. IS This is exactly what Singer means when he argues that 
not all members of Homo sapiens are persons, and not all persons are 
members of Homo sapiens. 
Where does this leave Singer regarding experimentation upon human 
embryos? It is recognized that research involving human embryos could 
be greatly beneficial in overcoming fertility problems and possibly 
advancing gene therapy and finding cures for many terrible diseases. 
Singer's case for human embryonic research is precisely founded on the 
possibility of such great benefits, which again reflects his self-
acknowledged ethical methodology of utilitarianism. He recognizes that it 
is not easy to argue that the human embryo is not a human being; 
nonetheless, he is prepared to do so. While acknowledging that the early 
human embryo is a member of Homo sapiens, Singer contends that "it" has 
no more awareness than a lettuce. The reason for this is that the early 
human embryo has no brain and no nervous system; and therefore, "it" 
does not process the mental qualities that distinguish "it" from other 
members of our species. 
Drawing upon his claim that an acorn is not the same as an old oak 
tree, Singer claims that an early human embryo is not the same as a human 
adult - "it" is not a human being - again his argument of potentiality. If a 
couple chooses to use abortion, contraception, or abstinence, they are 
acting to ensure that a person who might have existed will rtot exist. Singer 
claims that those who condemn the destruction of human embryos do not 
also condemn equally the use of contraceptives and sexual abstinence; 
hence, they cannot object to destroying a human embryo on the grounds 
that it is wrong because a person who might have existed will now not 
exist. This is based on an analogy that there is no distinction between 
throwing away the ingredients separately or after mixing if it is a cake one 
is after. Singer wants to use the brain to both define the beginning and the 
end of human life. Arguing that we declare a human person as dead when 
there is brain death, his claim maintains that we might consider that people 
are alive when their brains first begin to function. For Singer, brain death is 
an event and the "birth" of the brain is a gradual process. 
So, when is it justifiable for Singer to use human embryos for 
research? The answer given is that only when we reach a stage that the 
embryo might be capable of feeling pain must experimentation be subject 
to control since it is at this point that the embryo ranks morally with non-
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human animals. 16 There is no basis at all for not being concerned about a 
totally non-sentient human embryo as it can have no ends of its own. 
The doctrine of sanctity of human life, Singer says, comes out of the 
Christian ethical and cultural tradition in terms of distinction between 
members of our species and those of other species. While acknowledging 
that other cultures have not always promoted the doctrine of sanctity of 
human life, Singer argues that Christianity had an impact in changing 
attitudes in regard to abortion and infanticide in Europe. This was 
grounded in a new religion with a theological motivation that emphasized 
that all who are born of human parents have an immortal soul and a destiny 
of either eternal happiness or damnation. In Christianity, the belief of an 
immortal soul that is either rewarded or punished is the basis for the 
separation of Homo sapiens from other species as far as the significance of 
their lives is concerned. 
What does Singer offer as a solution? One possibility is to recognize 
the dignity of other species yet to consider it legitimate to kill retarded human 
infants in painful ways for experimental purposes, even when useful 
knowledge may not come from the experiments; in addition, we could give 
up any moral objectives against rearing and killing these infants for food. 
Finally, while treating our own species with respect, we can change our 
attitudes to members of other species such that we consider it wrong to kill 
them because we like to consume them or even because they are in 
intractable pain. Finally, we change our attitudes towards both humans and 
non-humans so that they come together at some point in between the present 
extremes. Singer's ultimate goal is to free us from a worldview depending 
on some specifically religious premises which then allow it to be shown 
that the early human embryo has no intrinsic value and no right of life. 17 
Singer's claim is that there is no evidence that taking the lives of members 
of our own species under certain special circumstances will have any kind 
of contagious effect in our attitudes to killing in other circumstances. 18 
Singer Critiqued 
I will begin a formal critique by examining Singer's claim that an 
early zygote or embryo is not a distinct human individual as demonstrated 
by monozygotic twinning. When the bacterium Eschericchia coli divides 
by binary fission, one E.coli cell splits into two daughter cells, neither of 
which is the original. None of us doubts, however, that there was one 
unique individual E.coli cell. The same process occurs everyday in 
somatic cells in our bodies. For example, when a lymphocyte (a white 
blood cell) undergoes mitosis, two identical daughter cells result from 
cellular division and neither of them is the original one. None of us would 
doubt that there was an original unique human lymphocyte - it simply 
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gave rise to two identical lymphocytes by cellular division. There are 
numerous examples of both prokaryotic and eukaryotic cells in nature that 
upon dividing give rise to two identical daughter cells, neither of which is 
the original one. But what about the case of two human embryos 
combining together to form one - a chimera? A chimera is composed of 
two distinct genetic tissues. While chimeras have been observed in 
embryonic mice and form by a process of recombination, if they occur in 
human embryos, it is very rare. 19 It is very likely not possible to know if 
one or both of the individual embryo(s) continues to exist or if there is a 
new (third) individual human embryo.20 If chimeras do form in human 
embryos, it is a reverse process of what I described in cellular division: 
two individual uruque human embryos "combine" resulting in a third 
unique individual human embryo that mayor may not "contain" one of the 
original two. 
It is important to recognize that monozygotic twinning is very rare -
it only occurs .22% of the time. 21 Also, it is not known with absolute 
certainty that chimeras form with human embryos; if they do, it is very 
rare. Singer is arguing against accepting that an early human embryo is a 
distinct human individual using "precepts" that are based upon "the 
exceptions to a rule" - monozygotic twinning and chimeras. The attempt 
to establish or refute the human individuality of human embryos should be 
based upon the normal, expected observations or "rules" of human 
embryology and not their exceptions. But what about the issue of 
totipotency in the early human embryo? It is well-established that the early 
embryo does consist of blastomeres that are totipotent. But this does not 
mean that each "blastomere" is a single individual by itself. It is correct 
that a totipotent cell, by definition, is able - in theory - to form a complete 
individual organism.22 While a four-cell embryo consists flf four totipotent 
blastomeres, each blastomere constitutes a part of the entire whole as long 
as the totipotent blastomere remains together.23 What happens if one 
blastomere is "teased off" the human embryo? Is "it" a human zygote? The 
best answer that can currently be provided is that up to the four-cell 
embryo, the removal of a totipotent blastomere could possibly be 
equivalent to a human zygote.24 Even if this turns out to be true, it does not 
preclude that originally there was one distinct individual embryo. It is 
known that in many plants there are totipotent cells. If one of these such 
cells is "removed" and placed in culture, "it" can give rise to another plant. 
Do we doubt there was one individual plant that gave rise to the second 
one? Or take the case of pluripotent stem cells (those which are somewhat 
committed) that are found in the bone marrow. If we isolate such a stem 
cell from an adult - pluripotent or totipotent - and induce it to becoming a 
particular "tissue" or a human zygote, does that mean there was not a 
distinct individual human being originally? Singer's arguments of 
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monozygotic twinning, chimeras, and totipotency fail to constitute 
definitive proof that the early human embryo is not a human individual. 
Are human embryos potentially persons? Singer argues that an eight-
cell embryo generated by IVF in the laboratory is a potential person if "it" 
is transferred to the uterus for implantation where it has a "chance of 
possibly becoming" a person.25 A human embryo generated by IVF at nine 
days, however, has zero probability as a blastocyst of becoming a person. 
St. Thomas Aquinas defmes potency as that which is necessarily related to 
act; in other words, there is never a case of potency without act. 26 The 
human embryo, therefore, is in act in regard to what it is now; "it" is in 
potency in regard to what "it" may subsequently become. Potency, 
therefore, recognizes that the human embryo who is alive in the laboratory 
- whether at the four-cell stage or the blastocyst stage (consisting of 
hundreds of cells) - is already in act and hence is a human being who is 
alive. "It" already is a human being in regard to the fact that "it" is alive and 
is an admixture of both potency and act. 
It is true that very many human embryos generated by IVF will not 
result in a live term birth. Yet as long as the human embryo remains alive in 
utero or in vitro, we have present a living human being at the earliest stages 
of biological development. Singer's utilitarianism is manifested by his 
argument: only those human embryos that have a possible chance of 
"becoming" persons with certain qualities are "potential" persons. Singer 
has rejected the classical notion of potency from philosophy and 
substituted for it the definition from the Oxford English Dictionary. For 
Singer, whether or not a human embryo in the laboratory can "potentially" 
become a human being depends upon our current stage of biomedical 
technology - it has nothing to do with the ontology of the being who is an 
admixture of both potency and act. 
What about parthenogenesis? Singer argues that it is not logically 
impossible for a human egg to develop into a person. I would first note that 
there is absolutely no evidence of parthenogenesis naturally occurring in 
our own species. It could, however, possibly occur if one were to "bypass 
nature" and manipulate the egg as was done recently by scientists at 
Advanced Cell Technology. Parthenogenesis in human beings results in the 
replication of only the maternal DNA; hence, all of the chromosomes are 
derived from only the egg. It is very likely that such a so-called "human 
embryo" as is generated by parthenogenesis is similar to the hydatidiform 
mole. Both of these conditions are generally thought to be incompatible 
with true human (embryonic) life from the very beginning. I would thus 
challenge Singer's claim that parthenogenesis is not a logical contradiction 
in our species and that the human embryo resulting from it is alive. Singer 
again uses the same utilitarian analogy with a human fetus that he used 
with a human embryo: if the human fetus in utero is going to die, then there 
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is no potential for personhood. This argument fails to recognize that the 
nature of a being who is an admixture of potency and act is not determined 
by the current state of technology. The nature of any being exists both 
objectively and independently apart from such technology. It has no 
bearing on whether or not the ontological status of "what" is present is a 
human being. All the current technology informs us is perhaps how long 
the new human being that was generated might survive. While Singer 
argues that parthenogenesis and fertilization are alike, there is a radical 
difference between a zygote possessing both maternal and paternal 
chromosomes versus one whose chromosomes are entirely maternal. 
While Singer is correct that both biological processes take the development 
of the egg a stage further, human fertilization does so in a manner usually 
compatible with human life while human parthenogenesis does not. 
But what about Singer's claim that if technology developed such that 
an egg could be "induced" to become a human zygote then every egg could 
be seen as a potential person? Every egg, by its very nature, is incapable of 
becoming a human embryo or "potential" person on its own, just as every 
sperm is also incapable by its nature of becoming a human embryo on its own. 
It is therefore not possible to say that an egg or sperm by itself and its nature is 
a "potential person." If it becomes possible to manipulate stem cells and 
induce them to become a living human embryo, such stem cells are not by 
their nature "potential persons." Take the case of Dolly, who was cloned. 
Was the somatic mammary gland used, by its very nature, oriented to 
becoming a "potential sheep"? Clearly, it was not; however, two hundred 
and seventy-seven attempts to generate a "Dolly" finally resulted in a living 
embryo that was brought to term - Dolly. If it becomes possible to 
manipulate and induce a hematopoietic stem cell from the bone marrow to 
become hepatic cells or tissue of the liver, that stem cell bJ' its very nature 
in the bone marrow was not a "potential" hepatocyte. So, why is it that for 
Singer the human embryo in the laboratory has no potential that is greatly 
different from that of the egg alone or the egg and sperm considered jointly? 
To address this critical issue, it is necessary to discuss human 
personhood as it relates to the beginning of human life. It is now necessary 
to examine the very nature of a human being as related to a human person 
from the beginning of "its" existence. For Singer, we can only count as 
persons those beings who clearly manifest certain qualities such as 
sentience or the capacity to feel pleasure or pain. Since, having no brain or 
nervous system that is organically manifested, a living human embryo at 
four weeks cannot possibly experience pain or pleasure. Thus, such an 
embryo cannot be a human person. 
In Singer's view, the early human embryo is comparable to a 
lettuceY He aims to challenge everyone - particularly the medical 
profession - to examine the very idea of why human life should have such 
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unique value. To do this we must examine the very nature of a human 
zygote - a human embryo. When IVF is employed to generate a human 
zygote in the laboratory, certain properties can immediately be observed: 
the synthesis of human proteins, the replication of DNA, and the division 
(mitosis) of the human embryo as growth continues. These observations or 
"effects" that are vegetative lead us to their cause: a human rational soul. 
The five genera of powers in the soul of a human person are vegetative, 
sensitive, appetitive, locomotive, and intellectuaU8 The only "effect" 
which we can observe at fertilization in the human zygote is vegetative -
this is the case for the human zygote generated by NF in the laboratory as 
well as in utero by conjugal intercourse. 
But how could it be possible to describe a human zygote as a human 
person when only vegetative operations of the soul are manifest? I would 
argue that it is not possible to accept a dualistic philosophy as regards all of 
the powers of the human soul; in other words, the observance of vegetative 
functions in the human zygote necessitates that all of the powers of the 
human rational and intellectual soul must be present as the Council of Vienna 
taught in 1312.29 The Church teaches that it is the soul which animates the 
body and that the soul is the form of the body. 30 That we observe immediately 
upon fertilization vegetative operations of the soul necessitates that all of 
the powers of the human soul - vegetative, sensitive, appetitive, locomo-
tive, and intellectual - are by necessity present in potency. While four of 
them - the sensitive, appetitive, locomotive, and intellectual - cannot be 
expressed or their effects observed in the human zygote due to the 
necessary organic structures that are not yet developed, there is an alive 
"being" who is both in potency and in act: a living human person at the 
earliest possible stage of biological development referred to as a human 
zygote who is a human embryo. It is St. Thomas Aquinas who allows us to 
properly state that the human zygote does not contain the soul; rather, it is 
the soul that contains the human zygote. The human zygote is a human 
being with a rational nature because of a human rational soul. It is this 
definition of person that Thomas Aquinas embraces: a person is an individ-
ual substance of a rational natureY The human zygote - who is in possession 
of a rational soul and hence has a rational nature - is a human person. 
Dignity of Humans and of Animals 
The idea that human persons are somehow superior to non-humans is 
for Singer specieism. He asks how it could be possible to argue that a 
severely retarded infant or an anencephalic one is superior to a "normal" 
baboon. To understand this properly requires a theological foundation: 
when God created human persons, He did so making them in His own 
image and likeness (Genesis 2:19-20, 9:1-4). The basis for the intrinsic 
222 Linacre Quarterly 
value and inviolable dignity of each human person from the moment of 
conception reflects the fact that each human being is by their soul made in 
the image and likeness of God. This is why the Church has stated that the 
human being must be respected - as a person - from the very first instant of 
his existence.32 John Paul II has noted that only man is capable of "tilling 
the earth" and "subduing it". 33 It is in this context that human beings have a 
unique identity and hence dignity that the non-human animals do not share. 
Though an anencephalic infant lacks an upper brain, he or she manifests 
vegetative and locomotive operations of the soul; the intellectual, sensitive, 
and appetitive powers are present in potency but cannot be expressed in act 
because the necessary organic matter is absent: the upper brain. 
What about a severely handicapped infant? Many of these infants are 
capable of experiencing pleasure and pain; however, what is most 
important to recognize is that they, too, have a rational soul that makes 
them a human person. That they may have extremely poor capacities for 
abstract thought and complex communication reflects a pathology on the 
organic level of matter - it has nothing to do with the metaphysical powers 
of their soul but rather in the exercise of those powers. Even though the 
severely handicapped infant may not function as well as some animals, 
such a human infant still possesses intrinsic dignity because of the 
existence of a human soul that is the substantial form of the living 
composite of body and soul. Though an orphaned infant who is "retarded" 
or "anencephalic" may not be able to exercise particular metaphysical 
powers of being due to abnormalities involving organic matter (structure 
and function) in the same manner that Koko the baboon can, such an infant 
is a human person who is a member of the species of Homo sapiens 
because of the existence of a human rational soul. 
On the other hand, Koko shows no evidence of beirtg able to engage 
in human reflective judgment or analysis any more than dolphins can do 
so. Singer'S argument that a severely retarded infant who is orphaned need 
not be classified as a human "person" while certain nonhuman animals 
could be classified as a "person" remains thoroughly unconvincing. 
But what about the dignity of animals? Singer has a valid point when 
arguing that animals should also be respected - the question becomes the 
dignity of non-human animals compared to that of human beings who are 
made in the direct image and likeness of God as reflected by the human 
rational soul. It was only to human beings who have a rational nature that 
God gave the universe in terms of dominion that is not absolute. Creation 
must be respected precisely because it is God's creation; hence, human 
beings can be said to be "stewards" of the earth. Human beings, therefore, 
have an intrinsic dignity that surpasses the dignity of animals in that it is 
only human beings who have a rational soul that reflects human beings 
made in the direct image and likeness of God Himself. The care of animals 
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is entrusted to human beings by God, which means that animals should be 
respected even though they do not possess a rational nature and hence do 
not have a rational soul. 
To compare a severely handicapped human being to one of the 
higher non-human animals and argue that the non-human animal is more 
"valuable" than the "defective" human being is utilitarian. It fails to 
recognize that the severely handicapped human being still possesses a 
rational nature due to a rational soul which none of the animals have. 
Gary Varner, the philosopher, recognizes that it is possible to 
attribute certain moral rights to animals while simultaneously using them 
for some types of medical research that is justified.34 Varner's view is a 
prudent one and even though he does not specify the exact type(s) of 
research, his position is consistent with that of the Catholic Church: 
medical and scientific experimentation on animals is morally acceptable 
practice if it remains within reasonable limits and contributes to caring for 
or saving human lives.35 
Humans, Animals, and Use of Reason 
Singer's effort is to re-define what the term "human" means and then 
to argue that it is possible for "human" to include an ape or dolphin while 
excluding a human being who is alive yet severely incapacitated. But what 
is the relationship between human infants and dolphins in their use of 
reason? St. Thomas Aquinas recognizes that nonhuman animals have a 
certain type of judgment from which they act. 36 Human infants, like 
dolphins, have prelinguistic reasons for actions, and the complexity of the 
relationships between the goods that they pursue and the means that they 
adopt in order to achieve them matches that exhibited by dolphin 
reasoning. Human infants, however, go beyond the reasoning characteristic 
of dolphins when they become able to reflect on and pass judgment on the 
reasons by which they have been guided - dolphins have shown no such 
evidence. Nonhuman animals do not have the same power of judgment as 
human beings do.37 This utilitarianism of Singer's methodology against 
"specieism" reflects the reality of what Alasdair MacIntyre observes in 
After Virtue: the rejection of the classical Aristotelian view of the world 
which allows for the moral vocabulary to be re-defined.38 
Is it justifiable to use human embryos for research that could possibly 
benefit humanity? For Singer, the fundamental question as to whether or 
not this is justifiable begins with sentience. Since human embryos do not 
have sentience for at least twenty-eight days after fertilization, Singer sees 
no problem in using "them." Only when a brain and nervous system appear 
do we need to be concerned about the human embryo possibly suffering. Prior 
to this point in time, research on human embryos is not an issue for Singer. 
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What about using an infant for such research? Singer replies that it 
would be justifiable to use orphaned infants who are severely handicapped. 
Singer's argument is that just as brain death defines the end of life, so should 
"brain birth" define the beginning of life. I would note that while brain 
death has been largely accepted to define the death of a human person, its 
acceptance is not universally absolute and research continues to occur on 
this most significant issue.39 Singer's view on judging whether to use human 
embryos for research based upon sentience and the benefits to be obtained 
is no different from his view on using an orphaned handicapped infant that 
nobody wants: using his self-admitted utilitarianism, he consistently and 
logically follows his moral principles to their disturbing conclusions.40 
Singer is very clear that he intends to challenge the doctrine of the 
sanctity of human life, which he says comes out of a Christian tradition. 
Emphasizing that Christianity taught the existence of an immortal soul, he 
argues that this teaching was the basis for specieism - believing that human 
beings are superior to other animals. This doctrine also affected the 
practices of abortion and infanticide. Singer's writings seem to take a 
somewhat bellicose position toward the very notion of God and 
Christianity as well as religion as demonstrated by his call to free ourselves 
from views that depend upon religion. He seems to reject the idea not only 
of a god but of God also creating human beings in His own image and 
likeness and giving humans dominion over the universe. 
I would argue that the rejection of God creating humanity in His own 
image and likeness undermines the very notion of an objective and 
inviolable dignity of human beings. Any perceived value or use of such 
beings must necessarily be defined in a highly subjective and arbitrary 
manner by an individual(s) deciding what moral status to assign to all 
living beings and hence what moral rights all such being~ are accorded. 
While Singer does not explicitly state that he rejects God and His creating 
humanity in His image and likeness, one wonders how Singer could do 
anything but reject God as I have so described Him. If this is what Singer is 
doing, it helps one better understand his consistent ethic of utilitarianism 
regarding human life and how the usefulness or value of any particular 
being is always judged according to the principle of utility. 
In this paper, I have examined the arguments of Peter Singer in terms 
of the moral status of the human embryo. While Singer has argued against 
the early human embryo being a human individual person, his arguments 
remain unconvincing from both a scientific and AristotelianfThomistic 
perspective. Rejecting specieism and the doctrine of the sanctity of human 
life, Singer has re-defined critical elements of the moral vocabulary such as 
"potential" and "person" against the classical notion. This effort has 
allowed him to advance his position that not all members of the species 
Homo sapiens are persons, and not all persons are members of the species 
August, 2005 225 
Homo sapiens. This serves as the basis for Singer's consistent utilitarian 
ethic that allows for the value of each life to be subjectively judged in terms 
of "its" capacities and being desired by others versus the benefit(s) that 
such a life could provide to others from being used, for example, for 
research. Rejecting the idea that every human life has an objective, 
inviolable dignity rooted in the doctrine of the sanctity of human life, the 
principle of utility for Singer serves to determine who should live and who 
should die. Do we really believe that Pete Singer's claim that taking lives 
of members of our own species under certain circumstances will not 
encourage us to kill in other circumstances? The evidence available to us 
from physician-assisted deaths in the Netherlands suggests the very 
opposite.41 The widespread acceptance of abortion in our own culture 
indicates the consequence of the devaluation of human life in utero against 
what Peter Singer is arguing. 
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